T HE NEW WHOLE NO. 6818. TORK HERALD. EDITION? FRIDAY, APRIL 27, 1855. PRICE TWO CENTS. INTERESTING EUROPEAN NEWS BY TBI STEAMSHIPS SAINT LOUIS AND AFRICA, The Loss of the Steamship North Carolina. THE TURKISH VIEW OF THE FOUR POINTS. Kecruiting in the United States for the British Army, The French Emperor's Exposition of the Cri mean Expedition, 4c., &c., <fcc. THE NEWS BY THE Sr. LOUIS. The steamship St. IouH, which left Havre on 11th instant* arrived at thu port yesterday morning. The St. Louis left Cowes at 8 A. M. on Thursday, April 12, and arrived at Sandy Hook at 12 midnight on the 20th April? passage 13 days 16 hours. She br:rgs 20# tons merchandise, French and Swiss goods, anu 75 passengers, amoDg them are Madame de Stankovitch, nee de la Grange, MM. Morelli and Mirati, of the Italian opera, engaged by Mr. Niblo. Her news has been anticipated by the arrival of the Africa at Halifax. In conuequence of there beirp a general holiday at Havre on tte 10th, the St. Louh did not leave ttiat port until late in the day of the 11th. Having taken on board her English mails and vaxsengeri at Cowes, sne left for New York at 6 o'clock on the morning of the 12th. The United States mail steamship Hermann, Captain Hlggins, en route from New York to Bramen, arrived at Southampton on the evenirg of the 7th instant The American now screw steninnhlp North Carolina, from Philadelphia to Liverpool, has bnen lost tn the English channel, by coming in contact with the ship Robert, which left Liverpool for New Orleans on the 5th instant. The Robert came in contact with the North Carolina about thirty miles west of Taskar light, striking her on 1be port side, forward of the fore raging, which caused her to fill immediately, and she sunk in about ten minutes. The captain and twenty one of th* crew were taken on board the Robert and conveyed back to Liverpool. The remainder of the eleven m*n were eeen in the boats alongside another ship at dayl'ght Beyond the lots of her cutwater, the Robert sustained little or no injury. The collision took place at 1 A. M. on the 8th lostant. The American ship John Rutledge, from New Yort, Arrived at Ltvcrpool on th? 6th instant, having lost two men overboard and suffered from bad weather on the 10th ult. Arrangements were being made in London anl other places for the purpose of testifying recpect to the Em peror and Empress of the French, when they arrive in England, on the intended visit to her Majesty. At a court of the Common Council in London, It was deter mined to provide an entertainment suitable to the dig nity of the city, to be held at the Guildhall, to which tie Emperor and Empress are to be Invited. Letters from Athens conta!n deplorable accounts of tke progrets of brigandage io various parts of Greece. To su:h an extent bas it proceeded that some foreign influence of a detestable character is supposed to be at Work. Geneiftl (? la Marmora was about to establish his head quarters at Genoa, from whence the embarkation of the Piedmontece contingent will proceed as rapidly as pos sible. Colonel Kelly was a prisoner at Sevastopol, and was ?lightly wounded. Capt. Montague was also a prisoner, lut was not wounded. There were alarms on the 24th aid 24th ult , but nothing important took place. It was ?xpected that the fire upon Sevastopol would open in the course of that week* The Wanderer of Vienna, of the 5th, says:? The Consuls-General of France and England, who have returned to Bucharest, after a prolong# t absence, hoist ed their lings on the 25th ult., and thus indicated la official fctyle that tin ciplcmatic relation! between tnose Powers aiid the gorernmeatof Wailachia were re estab lshed. Instructions of the Ottoman Plenipotentiary at the Vienna Conference. The Peris J 'ays gives as to'lows the text ot the instruc tions with which the Ottoman government his furnished its ambassador at Vienna, as to his conduct ia the con- < feience: ? As soon an your Excellency anaounced that Prince <3ort !bnl>off, in the name of lux government, had accept ed the four guarantee points, with the interpretation as signed to them by the three Powers, it w*s notified to your Exctlhncy, by order of his imperial Majesty, that you should attend the cooferi-ni-ea aiout to be opened, but that you should discuss the quesiioa* raised merely ad rrferitidum. The ccnd-.tlcns of the future peace a?e In fact of too { ?ital importance for the Sublime forte to permit o' their being decided without the greatest circumspection and the maturest reflections on cur part. It will only be after ? long and minute examination of those conditions and the questions of right connected with them as likewise el the dements of ttieir practical application? it will only be when everything shall have been concertel with our all'es, that our plenipotentiary at Vienna can be furnished with precise mi derfnte instruction* Never theless, ss It U requisite tiat your Excellency should have a tew succinct instruct ?n?, to which you citi.alipt your laLguage as the occasion may require, wa import to you the following general indications:? When the til* e snail have arrived for glvin; a com plete definition of the lour articles, and drawing up a plan for a treaty of peace, the ?ut>limc Porte having the indisputable r'glit to be heard bo h on tie principles that constitute its basis and on their practical come qusnces, it is it dispensable tha: this plio hcul l be srib xnitUd to our consideration before it shall be proposed to Russ:a fcr her acceptance, and thit we should first discuss 1 ; with the allied Powers, with the view of ar rivicg at one common resolution. This mode of proceeding is too natural to admit of a doubt respecting tbe adhesion of the representatives of those Posers on this subject. Nevertheless, by way of additional precaution, and to obviate my fu'ure mlaun derstsndisg or difficulty, your Excellency will on this Cint enter into formal explanations with Count Dual, rd Westmoreland, and Paron Bourqueney,and you will transmit to us the result. let us now proceed to the four articles above men tioned. In the first tt would be incumbsnt, when abolish' eg Russia's protectorate over WalUcbia and Moldavia, that the righ't- granted by the Porte to the-e two Principali ties, as al-o to ^ervia, should be established ic one or fanlc law, and plsced under the guarantee of the great oners On this article there are numerous otoer im fortant observations to be made, winch deserve the at entlon of the allies. In the ih? first place, tlity should not be left under the erroneous impression, which ap pears to exist, ttat a real protectorate has ever been granted to Russia by virtue of treati'S concerning the Danubisn pre vlnces. All that results Irom those treaties may be reduced to sn aisutance given to Run la, that the iaatitutions established in thtse provinces should be neither modified ncr destroyed. But under tu? pretext of neighborhood snd similarity of religion, Russia, as la well known, without the slightest resps it for exist ing lastitutloni, and by a great perversion of engage menu, sought msrely to gain Her own ends and satisfy her own private interests, as tbe oondust of the Russian consuls, In arrogating a ds facto sovereign ty at Jafsy and Bachaieat, has at all timet proved. It is therefore meet that tbe guarantee of the Powers should be clearly defined and explained, so that. with out at all interfering with tbe internal condition and ad ministration of the Principals ea it may confine lt*el appropriately to secunog their privilege' from destruc tion, snd their existing institutions from encroachment It Is equally etsentisl to constitute the prerogat.vei of tbe princes governing these provinces, so that they may not Indirectly trench upon the sovereign rights of the Porte. For the rest, farther and more spec al initrac tions will be sent to your Excellency on this last nimej point. *lth respect to the seccnd article, eoncerniog the question of the Danube, Russ a by her assumption of rights appertaining to tbe Sublime Porte on various flu ?ial points ot the river, has given Has to numerous and serious difficulties as to its free navigation It will be nseesssry for us to explain on our side oar observations respecting the means of both safeguarding ihe naviga tion of the Danube, and maintaining intact the righs nf tbe Sublime Porte along the banks of this river. Tbe third article relates to the revision of the treaty of Joly 18, 1841, wilh the view of connecting toe ex'st ?nce of the Ottoman empire more closely with the equi librium o? Europe, by putting an end to the predomi nance of Rusaia in the Bin "k Kea. the Subtims Porte, gratefnl for tbe display of sinters friendship waich the great Powt rs Intead bestowing oa her in tbia m itter, approves of the material me<ns by which thwe Pollers are desirous of virtnallv terminating the Kus.'iso pre ponderance. But it Is at tbe same time tbe duty of the Subline Porte to take good heed tbat ihe revision of the treaty of 1841 be not couched in terms capable of in fringing on its rights of sovereignty in the Hoaploriis aod Dardanelles, or over any other part of its territory where the sattty of the empire might possibly be on Oaarend. Ficslly, on arriving at the fourth article, slniM the repose end welfare ofsll tb? subjects of *ha Otninan empire are nf paramouat interest for Ihe Sublime Porte, it las frr tais object assured to all its Jbristisu subjert' k in tbr m?*t solemn and public mtunet U:e eojoynvu*. o( K^wVo"' ISStti *"'<??? accorded to them by the J ?7ly r, ii|? r'Mh- prede""0" of his present Ma impeiiel 1 ? f Tf* ? rec*i>tlj concede.! by Ui* gracious ^Jrt7?dort,,/ot kt lbe ??? time t fiii V on th^ Jl of the allied and friendlv Po *er* tbep wiil ^ntin ,? ? de?m *8 an object of the hlgheat imponaaoe thatwbat ever coB?rn. the internal ac mlnist?"on "Tth, "ubj^U Of tbe empire ibould not be the aubiect o? ?n! " J , | w>t compatible with the independence of the slib* lime Porte (an mdependance which the?e vJrl ?..^i Towers have declared their wish ?? f all,e'1 s^sr.%s?'; s: clause whatever bv whmh tl Tfull 8a,'r"D,fi?K ;SS=tSs-? ??? HH w?s: sap KISSES ceedizgt ol the Know Nothing- partv will have iriven th? a K,n,r?l idea of the distinctions subset?* be g?v ?r Atnir,can citizens and another b fween the native born Americans and tbos? t?rr nuinerius immigrants who from all cour.triea of ?7 JSf. ha\? been poured vea? after yesr into (he Utited S?^ps??s?E!s:ass.tKr i ara&sswjwST^S^ EF(r,?r^ would a aggreuf ions of Kms.a than sf&ss sawa ? ; ??'v r ?S.*S ml.i?, o ii g between Yankees an' Bri'isheri n ight eaMly commnntcare * smack o' milieu to tne Am. ricaii vi. w of rur pi.-ceeoing. but wh-n Vn Vki. i J''","''1!1 *.e f??' entirely person ed that ths re?l and f j fte .ngs of tto American people Auirlo Sk? in bkod, lcrgua^fe and in.t.tution J^mun b* in unison w nirt an?.tbat.th<:t^uCf?T,cP;uh!^,' of the States rx:?4tt^z? *"?< ac"D.Bi' Arable disposition among the native Americans to take service under o-r flair if i-idmin.. '<?? r'-a. that - * f0 ea8er for martial occupation that, it it were not procurable in one place tbev mi,n accept it in another l.es'des wbich,tt is said that th??e vel"isUaiid ihtf,01 th? P^.thelf addiction to no veil ict, am their constitutional love of -ouldbaveit.ured a large .upply of re^uUs Not a word, however, is mentioned about any iymn"thr wita Jh!^nci,'!!f at sta*e: on t,je contrary, it is int .ml ed ea npith?111 actuating the vo'unti? would bX. Sita^Er*011 Prospects of . recompense nor any p" ,i"J 'flings of amity, but would be ccnflned litaUiiv 'ocurioMtj, pugnacity, and the eesire of chirnre An opportunity would be otleied of seeing foreign l.nd? >n t uSnt tf* Hk0 11 ??htlng at the s..mo time, and t bis temptation would have been sufficient Am.ri^f would have been glad to exhibit tbrt? wuriTlS ? Ol'uJn,*, ?,"? raT0!,bk !or oi"P'*J as the Crime* OJ tLe noiinatiyeor ltnmigrant portion of the nonni^ tk n we are informed that the lii.U alone would t^kef; to stand airof from the eiliftmeot office, evea the natu /ll cot. bati vent-da of their r*ce bein^ overpow-red on }' as CQ' a8i.r.n thtir hostility to England. 1 h* rt-main fog conatituenta ot the clans ? Uermats, Hi Isieine-n 4c. would be well dl>pps?d to the service? aH the more so, inc.ee 1 from the late pressure of the tin e ;?Z?t sub iateVee'. T'8Di3edWi,h, fcW de"','te r>??P?ts of i ? : "D 1 as am, D? "'?o there wonll be a con sU*fr|ib)e proportioa of ram tia oed more or less to arras the reasonable oir?r? of a recruit ng agent would be verv ? lllitgjy embraced, it s.em , Inde-o, frCm whit we rea< n Ihe American journals, as if that particular class wrtMiu |W,"i,l'VbJ,ct o/ our Foreign Knlist ttfi?t bill o enrol existed in greiter and rarro diipoaable numbers >n the United States tb?n ai v where that the ?Jace to fin" tri nfd fo)?'ier/.ot the con'inratal AWMira"* '?r lcT"&u t,ITlce ??? undoublodiy St me I'ifcrepancies of opinion teem to prevail as t^ the reeutts already in evidence; but, upon tli? whole i,'7'ap^?18; we think, very little reason to doubt that ,"??i,i w- temper of the peof le goes, a stroog legton acr>!f ? n ;f iDh li'ted Mates for co op -ration ? eX8<edl0i^ "W" difficulty. ' It is ? J.*! *a,-,8 0De P?PPr. "that 10 000 men could be nptedily furni? lied;", and no question can be ihHs'to ?? f??t0 tL? gM1Vu 1 eiM,1<,BC<> of the eoldiers thus to te ferthcoming. The courage. in'elliBen*e and wLTl^ C M,h# A?MicM1" are well In o wij, and t aot e ltide'at'gable energies which hurry them over a whole fln^,1?m?t?n.q,,e,'t ?f 'xci,<'mcnt or occupation would find ample tcope >n the contingencies of such a war as that cow rigirg. On ih? other side, tie Ger man immigrants, having Wn, for tbe mo it p*rt inured to military dis.ipiioe, pos-esi.ng in some cans, probably a prar.tlcal knowle. go of arn s, and beina getexaHy of mature age and vigor, would s apply exactly the c a:-s of troop.4 which are most ia ranneat at present It it rot ttat Great Britain is deftitute of men or that rB:5u't'ng have been exhausted by a twelvenioDtb e campaign. On tie coutrarv,onr recruitins W *icce<?fullv ; but it h.ppeus thit, whereat ar? w*Ptcd '?wediat?ly, it tal.es two years or ,nti el?rrn k ' Itier, and to transform tbe willing M ,( i. Lr i1! disciplined soldier. We should have hnt ih?T .Ui 7 ln/*'eJDS 61,000 men for the year 18!?8, which we T tfc* 3 *" 1866 As the c*us? which we are fighting it a common one, there can be no testcn why we ebeuld not accept tbe co opera ion of otters wherever it ctn be lawfully obtaia-d, and, if the flZ'Z hi' /a? , thS w,y 10 takc SebuMopnl, we aTaS/otrLT* t0 ,<arn' an" 10 9>"et'"-"' THE NEWS BY THE AFRICA. Hie Cueard steamship Africa arrived at har dosk at Boston at a quarter past 8 o'clock yesterday noralng, making the run from Halifax In thirty one hour* She was just too late to save the early train for New Yerk, the mails thcre'ore leave in the afternoon, reaching New Toik early this morning;. tror.n alter leavitg Halifax, n cabin passenger miase.l ?CC0 sterling, and it is supposed the money waa at ilea. On the Africa'* arrival at Boston, ni communication wis allowed with the ship, and a general search of the pia lingers tcok place. The robbery on board the steamer amounted to ?500 sterling in gold, alao Bank of England note* and jewelry ? making in all about ?1,6(0 sterling. The property belonged to Mr. E Colllcgwoed, one of the passengers, and baa tot been recovered. Ibe Erglish paptrs contain very little news additional to tbat telegraphed from Halifax. A despatch from Dover, dated 13th instant, states that the Neptune, 120 guns, Rear Admiral Cochrane, with twelve aail of the fleet, were moored ;n Dover Bay, awaiting the arrival of Ihe imperial visiters from France. The Expedition to the Kaut. The Monitcur ot Ajrtl 11 contains the following ar ticle It is the Incontestable right or a great country like Frai.ce to know the truth wben it interests the honor, tbe secur.ty, and the power of the State It la the sacred doty of a strong government like that of tbe Emp?ror to make known tne truth wben ailence la not impos?d by Ihe patriotism of that public welfare. The expedition to the East, it* causes, Its object, tbe mili tary operation*) prepared to support it are at preoeot facta for discussion previously to becoming pages of his Ury. Tbat theae facta may be usefully discussed and se riously judged, we shall now expose them with the moet scrupulous eiactitude. This appears to na both loyal and useful Public opinion is prompt to take a>eim, aid easily len into error in the midatof emotions and evehts like those of wblsh each day It experencea the coutterblow. The best way of reassuring It is to enlighten it. How was the expedition to tbe Eat t conceived? On wbai provisions and ilata w.-?s its plan formed P What were tbe cauaes that modified it? Why t did the Anglo Fnnch army land in tie Crime*, instead of acting on Mk Danube and makitg a camdaign in Bessarabia? How ate we to explain tbe long resistance of tbe besieged m presence of tbe ardour ai?d heroism of tie better*? Hucli are points which we purpose examining in the first pait of tbia taak. In this examiamg we shall only deal with acknowledged facta, authentic documents, trutba of science and of military hixtory. 'Ibe imperious and decisive circumataocet whish bid France draw tbe sword after a forty year ' pi?,'e aie lie. ant to etery mild. Hu??ia not being able t' mate TurVey aceept h?r xapremacy by the terrr.r of ber pro tocols. attempted to aw* htr by force. Rn?. tore up tieeties, invaded a territory detained and thr.-nlencJ KuTOpe. Hit armies o-cupied the Prina'p*l t en were advancing cn tbeDnnube. and marked out a'/ 'a !y tbi ?tatlon? fcr a victorious tnarcb ?. vet tie Ua Uasi. Tne aimirable epiut displayed! by the iTurkish nation did not suffice to diacoaoert this plan. Rus, 'ia. it is true, foand Bn uneipeciK obstacle in the heroic' devotion ot a peo ple whom the bad tbonght sunk in d*:ay, and the re sistance of which made it remember that it hid van quished Peter the Gieat. But the struggle wui unequal. Tbw whole world, pantirg with emotion, anxiously awaited the remit. Germany, halting between the cusiomH of ttie Holy Al liance aL<! it* dignity, could not maie up Its min i whe tLer it wa? o e u lit r any longer the arrogance of that don ination which weulied upon it, or whetbw it wan to throw it < If at last li war fiom the West tlw\t the sig nal of resistance was given Fiwuce and England, loy ally united did cot hesitate to send their armies and their fleets into the Fast, there to defend the integrity of the Ottoman empire, the respect for treaties, the ba lance ot tower, acu the civilization of Kurope. The firm wl) which piesices over the government o ? our country, *nd which had resolved upon this war a a necessity foriti tonor, bavin; in vain attempted t I if vent it bj an honorable conciliation, then drew u instructs oh 'or the illus r.ous Marebal to whoso hand thf sword of France was to bs intruited. These in structlons, which bear the date of the 12th af April, 18fi4, contained the following past-ages: ? * * In placing ou. Mardhal, at the head of a Frecc srniT. to tight nt a rintance of more than 600 laa,ua fre m our cotter country, nit first recommendation 1< to have a csre for the health of tne troops, to spirt) tin in u? much as possible, an: to give battle only after having made sure first of, at least, two chance* out of tbice lor a favorable mult. Top peninsula of Gallipoll is adopted as the principal point ot d'tem threat Ion, because It must be, ap a strate gical point, the ban* of our operations; that ia to say, Ibe place d'armcs for our depots, our ambulances, our provision stores, acd whence we may with facility either advance or re embark Ihis will not piuvent you on 3 our arrival should you deem it advisable, from lodging one or two revisions in the barracks, which are either to the west of Conttan'.inople or at tcutari. As lcpg as you are not in presence of the enemy, the spreading of your trcops '.annot be attended with incon venisnce and the prtMn c of your trocps at Constanti nople mny produce a good moral effect; but if, per chance alter having advanced towards the Balkans, you should be constrained to beat a retreat, it would' be much more advantageous to regain tbe c.oa't of Galli poll than that rf ConMantirop'e, tor tbe Russians would never vemure to advance from A'lrUnople upon Con stantinople leaving sixty thou? an i good t;oup* on their right. If, revrrtbeless, there should be the intention of forti fying the line from Ksrasu, in front of Constantinople, it rliould only le done with ilia intention of leaving its cefence to the Turks alone, for, I repeat it, our posit. oa would be more independent, more redoubtable, when on the Hanks of the Kuesian army, than if we were block ade'! in tbe Ibrsclan peninsula. Die first point established, aud the Anglo Frenah army crce uniteo on tbe shores ot the fc'ea *f Marmora, you roust coo cert in-asuiep with Omar l'asha and Lord Rag lan lor the adoption of one of the three following pUn* 1- hither to advance to meet the Russians on the Dal kans. 2. Or to seize upon the Crimea. U Or to land at Odessa, or on any other point of the Russ an ccast of the black ,"-ea. li tbe fiist cise, Varna appeals to me the most impor tait point to be occupied ihe infantry might be taken theie by sea, and the cavalry more eai-iiy, perhaps, by land Ou no acsoant ought the army to go too far from Ibe B'acs Sea, so as to be always in free communication with its fleet. In tbe second case, that the occupation of the Crimea, the place ot landing must first bo made sure of, tha* it may tat e place at a distance from the enemy, and that it may be speedily fortiGed, so as to terve as a point d' oj 7. in to tall back upon in case of a retreat, 'ilecaptuie of Sebsstopol must not be att*mpt.4d without at least half a -i^g" train, and a grjat number of sacks for earth. When within reach of the p lacs, do not on.il seir'ng upon Balaklava, a little port situated about tour league- south of Eebastopol, and by means ct which eaey ci mmunicat ons may be kept up with the ileet during tbe siege. In tbe thud case, try principal recommendation is never to divide your army ; to march always with all your tioops united, tor 40, (0(i compact men ably com matted are always an iirpofing force; divided, on the contrary, are nothing. if compelled ou account of scarcity of provis'ons, to divide tb" army, co so in . uch manner as always te be able to unite it on one point witl.in twetyfour hours. If, wb> n march. u;. you form different columns, esta bbeb a common rallying point ut some distant from tie eremy. llat none ot them may be ettac*ed singly. II you drive back the Ku*s>ans. do not go beyond the lannbe unless the Austrians enter the lists. /if a general rule, every movements must be concerted with tbe 1 ngli.-li 1 1 mtnancer-iL-Chief. I'bere are only certain exceptionol casrs where tue safety of the army mi. hi be concerned, when jou night act enyourown lesolution 1 place perfect ccxfide^ce in you, Marshal; I am lure yo 1 will foil- w then" ltttruct of-s faithfully, and you will know bow to add a net7 tiory to that of ooreaglvst i"i< m 1he nboTe extract liora the Emperor's instruc tions to Mimhsl de ft. An aur, it will he seen that Gal 1 poli was (elected as the Irnr.irg point for the Anglo lretohaimy. We icuat dwe'l up<-u the grave canside ratins which ccuircdled that selecticn. Ibe first principle In 'i maritime war is to select a meeting place sheltered from the attacks oi tbe enemy, cspable of being easily dtfendu.% of euty access for tho cUtmbai cation and provisions of tbe army, and of a na tore to allow the laiter to ndvance or full back on its ba tis ot operations, if compelled to do so : and. in case of teilure, to fir.d auppoit tLero and a refuge on board the lleet. 'ibe peninsula of Gsl'ipoli offered every advantage for a gco< maritime war. Situated at the tn'rance of the tntmoce of the Tardanelles, it could be easily provi slot eo by the Sea 01 Marmora, too by th* Sea of Thrace A chief reason drawn from the respective situation! of tie Russian and lurUsh armies pointed out the nece* el'j of tasii>g possession of that point. The Russ'aiu, by 'crossing tbe Dnn?bu at Rustcli ik, in advancing on Acrlacople, and In leaviri; to their lolt thf Turiish for treeseM and even t onstantinople, r>ii'ght be befor*h*nd with us there, and cut oil the retreat to our fleets en gaged in the Biaek tea. lher* was a great dang?r there which the foresight of tbe allied governments knew heiw to guard against in time. Anotber consideration also pointed ont the necessity of occvpv ing Gallipoll. At tbe time of the departure of the erpeditioE? that is to say, in April, 1854, it was snaicusly asked whether our tioops would arrive in lime to cover Constantinople* A cefensive war appear ed the n mote probable tbnn an offensive one. it was the integrity of the Ottcroan ettpira which was men aced and already attacked, and which we were about to defied. A battle 10 r t by tr-e Turks on the Danube might have I biougbt the RuteiaoB in three days' march ou the IUI- j ka?s, and opened to ttem the road to Constantinople. Tlie cccupation ot Gnllipoll entirely covered that capi ta). Ibe two allied governments uadertood tbat a Uua s an army, even if it occupied Adrianople, could not ad vance cn ConatanMn< pie, leavirg CO, 000 Aoglo French od its right flank, and this wus provided for in tho Km pern's instrnCiODS, Thus, i- every point of view, to be prepared for every eventuality, tbe peninsula o( GeUipoli was admirably (elected an a lauding pont and basis of operations, l'rom this po nt we could protect the capital of the Turkish empire We bad our fleets at our command; we ituld aovance without eipoauie, and we kept up our cemmui.icatione withToulcn and Marseilles. Hut ecarce'y bad tbe Anglo-trench army arrived at t;ail'poli when the scene changed Although tbe Rus i'an skirmishers bad been eeen from Varna, the heroic de'ente of rihstria baa stoppol tbe ardor of PrinceGort schakrfT. The struggle, instead of being carried Into tie beart of the empire, was prolonged on the Danube w th varied chances of success. The commanders of tie expedition tben thought they would have time to reach the theatje of the struggle, and perhaps to save Kilittria, but at a.l evecU to join tbe Ottoman army and 1o defend the Ba ikons againet the Russians, having their 10 to say, protected by tie fortresses of SehumU aco Varna. 11,18 plan wos as held aa it was piudent. It was in dicated, moreover, by circumstances and by the immi ntnre oi tbe danger. If, in iae;, tbe Rassisns had taken bilietria. the fall of which was announced as ne-itable bj Omar Paaba's ieport?, the 'ate of the Ottoman em pire might depend upon a gnat bstile. It was requeue for the armies of France and Fog land to be preptred for it. there was their post, becaute there, perhaps, tbe itruggle would be dtciced, and ihe supreme decrees of late be fulfilled. Ixents did net reaiite these provisions. Ihe courage of ibe Turkieh amy and the presence of the allies auflic i d to irake tbe Rui-sisns raise tbe siege and withdraw ts th? other sice oi tbe Danuce. Whenever au enemy re tiies it tflers a great temptation to the army before which it retires? riamely, to pursue; but, when such puiruit may coit oromiee an army, there la more glory in unainiig still >1 an in advancing. The lore ot glory murt Lever outttrip tbe biddings of wiedom. What could the Anglo French army have done by en t? ring a devastated country without roads, inundated by water, and infected with pestilential diseases > They would i ave found, not victory, bnt destruction without a struggle? death without a compensation. It tan teen said that alter tbe retreat of the Russians operations ehould have been commenoed oa the Danube, srd Fenarabia entered, l.et us ray it at occ?? without the consent of Austria, ocr army was forbidden, under penalty of the most nrea<Mnl catastrophe, to advance on tbe Danube. Let ue rot. in fact, target that fundamental point, that our basis of operations was tbe sea; to lose that w*a to risk and c< a promise all. it is rot only military science hut common seme which forbids 60,000 Annie- French an. I eo.flot) lurks to ac venture Into An nnbeaitny. impracti cable cirntiy ; not having sufficient means of transport nt our die|<mal, nor sufficient cavalry, nor reserve artil lery. tor siege pieces, nor depots of provisions at dhum la, f t Varna, or ibiistria. M\ th< ss resources, indispensable to a campaign, could not ho conjured np lo a day at 800 leagues from tcrev. v> shovld have been totally in want of them. \\ * i Lonld have been in pretence of a Russian army of ';((>,? CI wen, wtich would bave awaited u? on a firm tfoiirg ?n its own ground. or in retreating before us neuld fcave led us into e?me still more daigerooi po?l lit n, .'cav'ng us to other alterative than an un^uil lat'iocran impoa?lble retreat. A ?Jrrple two dajs' recnDoisest.ee in the Dobrulsths, v) Mi to>f ti- n.oie than tbe n.oet iantu'nary cuabti, ir a f uof cf wliat w* ?sy. Generals not undesst%n>l*ng tbe <ierf ? i of such an enterpii<r m k tit have co*amttteit iTtepsriWe error, and wou'.d bsve comptotasea ? ere do sr.t nentato to sey io? the :e?|onsibility of command. Tr nai i-n cawpKitn btjond tbe Danube and on the 1'intt poshib'e, we repeat it the co operation of Au?trU winie.erfary Now. a grveroroe rf new r (roe< to w?r oo'fs cctn|el!ed to do so 9} uuavoji able cUcuro- auvrs, It only goes to war if it can do so. Austr4* wm n?t pre paieu at that moment. in breaking with Kueaia aba nibbed to b.<* certain of Germany, auu havo 500, u00 men under arm*. Her dig nity, her interest!, the example ot' tbe Western l'o?rer< urged Iter to pronounce bert.elf and act; prudence bade her wait and collect ber military forces, strengthen" tier pc'itical alliances, before joining ut tbe struggle. But what could til* united Genera's do at Varna aft*/ tbe retreat ol the Hnxaian army'/ Were they to remits in an inactivity ? hi.-h would h#Te lei t? discourage ment, and from wbich tbe prrttigr M our dag wouid in evitably buvo aulleredV Neither miliary boaor nor po litical inter, tits al.'owed tbe Commander in- Chief to take such a do jit ion Onco ?>n this (treat theatre, inaction was out of the question; >t wan nt-ce?. ary to act, tJ t?l?w our object to tl?e troop*, to compel the enemy to fear aa, to excite the ambition of Europe to follow us by uroii^ng its admira tion and respect It vas then only that a landing in ihe Crimea was mooted. An expedition agaiait Sobustopcl might hasten the denotn im-nt of tie war. It had a determined Mid limited obj? ct; it might place in the hands'ef the allies a pro vince and a stronghold which, once cunqucreJ, would be a pledge ?nd a means of exchange obtain peice. II was under the influence of ttiose considerations that the Comic ander-in Chief conceived the idea and decreed the execution of the plan. Tliis expedition having been examined at Paris an! London at. an eventuality, tae Marshal St. ArnmiU re ceived then. cot. the instructions? they coulinot be given at f uch a distance ? but the following advio?:-? To pbtnin exact information of the strength of the Xust-ian forces in the Crimea; it' not too considerable, to land at a spot which mi-bt ferve as a basis for opera tions. TLcodosia (now KafTa) appeared the most eligi ble spot; although that point of the coast has the dis advantage of t'e ng d:stant lorty leagues from Hobasto prl it nevertheless oll?rs great advantages. 1'irst, its hay is vast and safe; it wruld liolj all tha t? ifels of the squadron and the vesnels with provisions lor the troops. Secondly, once established oa that point, it might be made a real basis for operations. In thus occupying thw eastern point of the Crimea all tbe reinforcet . t uts coming bytbeSeaof Azofif anl the Caucat uc could be cut otl'. A gradual tdvaace coald be made towards the centre of tee country , taking advan tage of all its resources S rapheropol, the strategio ' centre of the perineals, would i>e occupicd. An advance would then be nude on Sevastopol, and probably a great ba'tle (ought on tliat road. If lost, a retreat in g< ol rrcer cn Katla, and nothing is comf.ro nv.srrt; if gained, to besiege HebiStopol, to invest it com pletely, and its surienoer would follow as a matter of course in a short inteivitl. Hut scarcely victors, they perjelvol th'y bad no port to serve them s.i a iia^is f .r operation!). Then, urged by that invincible ios inc. ol pre crvation which never de ceive , in all haste they advanced south of SebiUopul towards Ualakiava it wa^ moreover, clear that the | aimy could not maintain it-elf and live in aa enemy j country unlets in ilireet communication with the fleet. t!nb?ppily, those counsels were not followed. Bs it tliht the lonimanders-ln-Cbief bad not sufficient troops to take so loog a journoj in the Crimea, be it that ttiey expected a more speedy result by a bold and sudd -u coup de main, tbe> resolvet', as is known, to land at a few leagaes only fiom Sevastopol, lie glorious battle of Alma at first justified their (tension. But iliis compulsory and necessary return towa/rdstne sea led to the a>anc'onment of the northern heights of Setastopol, the occupation of which alone allowed the investment of the place. The Anglo Franc a arm/ was not, in tact, numerous enough to make a complete in vestment. It war, therefore, necessary to limit it to an attack on the south tide. To accomplish thli operation the F.aglisli ta jk posses sion of the port of B?!aklava; the French, seeking u point tl'appui on Ibe shore to Hod their provisions end artillery, providentially found the port of Kamiesali. The soloiers, who are never deceived, caM it, in fast, tiie pert of Providence. Sebastopol", as is known, is not surrounded by battle ments; It Is rather a great mlrenjhed camp, containing generally an army of from lb,0? 0 t> 'JO.OO'J men, already protected at tbe commencement of the seigo by numer ou* earth batteries, and especially by the Kushian fleet, which, well placed in the inner port, could b-ar up >n all the avenues by which the allies could advance upon the place. At this period that is to s ay when the Anglo French amy arrived lefoie Scbastopo', tie a.-jsault might per heps, have hi en nttempted; but it was already & h v/. i r e'eus enterprise, without suflici<ut art tilery to silence that of the enemy. Leubtless nothing was impossible to an Anglo French srmy comjios-d ot generals and niea line those who have given such proo<a during the last six months ta ibe danger, fatigues and sutlerings of t&is loog siege; but (?i:j?j alone coulo justify to daring an attempt. The first duty imposed by the re.-poasioilitie.s of com mand is prudence, and prucence ptt'iciloed ui the Com menders in Ch.ef cot to a'teinit to as nut with. -it iuoct, in army of 10,000 men, phi ed on u rock, ds'acie i', cf artillery or amiuunit'on reserves, without being de fenced by intrenebment^ in the rear, aud with no other teluge bu: the ships. !t would have teen risking on a ca-it the fortune and fate ef the expedition, and nothing must be risked at a uistanceAf KOO li-sgues from the mother country. The coup tb main ohich the Generals thought pcasible alter tbe battln of tbe Alma having escaped them, mere rema'ned (or them a regulsr siege according to the rulea of military art. At tLe very onset ths Ku?si?na took two nost ? flicacious measures, very regrettable for us. Ibe first was I*ri?ce Menchikoll's strttegii move, who. Inst vail of shutting h.rr.self up in Sebastopol, marched on Simpberopol, ana kept tbe lield sod free omtnunica t on with tbe btnegfd city; the eecond was the energetic dicisicnof sinking n pc rtion o' the man-of-war, which rendeied the entmy's porr inacces.'ioie to our fleets, and gave some 500 or 6(u guns, with thsir sailorc, as gunners, to assist in the defence of ibe town. Ibns, although tbe town already presented a formida ble row of guns, te.w batteries rose, as if by enchint. rcent, asl our fee t ie siege artiUry coaid not master the fire of tlie town, From this moment it becams evident to all fhat Sebai tcpol could only be taken alter a long strangle, with pcweiful reinforcements, at tbe cost perhaps of eangui tary battles. Th.s situation was grave. It was looxed upon by tbe Commander in-Chief with that calmness which elevates character* to tbe height of tie greatest responsibilities. litis in tbe place to speak of General Canrobert and of Lord ftaglan, aa h.stcry will speak of tlmm. Their part in tbis great scene has been worthy of the two countries whtse swords they bear. Opposed to immense obstu eltK, they measured ihem only to triumph ovei them by courage, perreverance, and devotion. llie aimy, mpported by tbeir example, sulfa red with out a complaint, exposed to ail the rigors of a terrible winter ; having only poles ia tbe earth aod small tents to shield tt em aga list cc;ld and tor.ents of r?in, they nti'veitry skciidce to the honor of their Hag and to their country, and to the confidence tbey ha^ in. their chiefs, whem ihey learnt to love and honor on tbe field of battle. 1? appreciate folly the immense difficulties of the en terprise conceived and executed by the commanders, it may net te out of place, perhaps, to explain in what a rtgular siege consists. Ibe siege of h'e^astopal ha i scarcely aoy ana lo(!V in our military teats of nrmii. To attaok a place which is not invented, when the ecemy, superior in number, cm 1>e revictualled and rein forced in men, provisions and munitions of war, and when he bol<?s tbe open country, Is no act of aadacitp which could he ser>ontly attempted only by Ingltnd and Fiance united frr an object nesucsary for Ivurcpe. Tbe siege of Dantzig has been much cited and admired as one of those in wiiicb heroism, united with science, triumphed over tbe greatest ciflieultieti of a for midable and obstinate defence. Dantzig, protects! by the Vistula, whoae month on the Baltic is shut by the tort cf Veicliselmande, was placed equally in conditions l.tfle favorable lor a complete investment: but it was jeesible, bowever, to take position on the river, between the fort which shut its mouth and the city, thus to in tercept the communications with tbe sea and to invest the place. 11rs is what took place under the command of Marshal I.efebvre. KevetUelets, although this pUce wa-s in -!oj ed within our hues of attack, notwithstanding the vicin ity of tbe imperor b apoleon, who covered the siege with a numeious army, and paralysed the attempts at relief of Piussia and Kussia, tbe resistance o! Danlzlg was pro longed for fifty one days ot open trenches. Subsequent ly, after tbe retreat frotp Moscow, tuts city, occuptad by tl.e Fretcb capitulated only after a defence of one year, ana a combined attack by lsnd and sea. We mi gat mul tiply examples, but these will suffice to prove th?n tbe Anplo I re neb army liasdcne m the Climes all that could be expected from its courtge and the skill of its chiefs. If !oet, a retreat la good order may be made on Katra, i rd toiliing s at.muiomised; if it is gained, siege is Uud to Peb?stop?l, which maybe completely invested, aod its ?urieccer obtained at the end ol a short period. Un 1 sjpt y, t' eie counsels were not followed. Whether it wss th?t tbe generals in chief bad not troop . safficiont for making tbis long course In the Crimea, or that tbey anticipated a k ore spe? dy rsi ult frcm a baidy and un expected coup de main, the recolutioe wss taken, as is known, to disembark at ion* leagues only from Sebu topoL The Exposition of l<oali Kapoleon. [Kicm the London Times, April 12. Tbe clear, though elaborate sta'eia-nt of the nUlitary f pt rations of tbe allied arm es i* the East, which has teen published by tbe French Gavernment in tbs .tfoni trvr , will be read In all parts of tbe world, with in - teoi-e Interest, for the Fmpeier of the h'reoeh pays a i ot tiniiererved homage to the force and justice of I ublio opinion, by submitting the whole course of a isnpaign and an expeni'.ion not yet concluded to the cri ticism. of France, to tbe knowledge of our adversary, and to the jodgmi et of foreign nations. We eonfeas that we ourselves bsve peruteA this remarkable document with a degree of satisfaction, which Is inoseased by the unexpected discovery that the strategical opioiona ex 1 rssser in this journal froaa tbe comaeo cement of these operations are identical in every point, save one, with tbi views ontertained by tbe French governmvnt and ito m litsry sdvlseis. In attempting te defend these opi rlons by such arguments as our own knowledge of the theatre of opetatloss and ef tbe ait of war ? nabltd us to suggest we certainly were quite one an scions that tbe very same points were those on which tbe cabinet of the Tuileties leMed for the success of tae < xpeditkn; but, although, aa is apt tn be the oaae in tbe ccnduct ot militsrv affairs, many unforeseen difficulties l.ave s riser, snd tbe result has not yet been equal to our , acrifices and our expectations we remain unshaken In our ccnvietion that the main strategical movement* of the last campaign were perfectly sound, and that, is act. no others could reasonably have been attempted. (iv r readers may remeoT'tier that oonaidcrably before tV ? Milnrstlon of wer, and wh*-n our tliets ha. gone up to Bticoe Bay In the ?lrter ol UV'-4, we o^u.lotiilijr dwelt open the importance of Tliraclan CberiOBMUl ( the base of our position for the defence c.* Conetaani ? I plii and ol ReunWia, woich wm tnen the p.'lmar.' object ' of our intervefltloa. The instructions of the kin reror of the French to Marshal St. Arnaud, bearing iate the 12th of April, exactly ok# j ear ago. are directed in the first hwance to this point. Gallipoli was the base of opeiaUofM, h? cause in the event of the dct-at ot the t'urki o.^ the Danube. and the p.ssage of tie Balkan bv a Bus *?*{? ariay tliat forie wonkl hare been outflaukad by the lied troops tn Thrace, and its maich on the cap.tai b eome impojuble. At the same time the possession o. the Dardanelles secured our maritime ooruainmca fons which might otherwise have be?% threatened hv the enemy. Xoese prepiratians were pur ly i..f?ti?ive out our position in the war wis ? <ur a 'defeusive character. The force originally ntnt " u t"PD ? I ? UkJ of u t ,0,100 French and 2W *.tM> troonL" and the operations contemplated at that tiuie werewaulated hy the necessity of the ea?- an l by t ? ' | that army. We, therefore, hold, ?? tbe i' rench s~*tinie?-3t very a^ly mainline, that the occupa f,? of a wisean-1 correct determination on tie patt 01 th- uMfes under what were ?n.l auticip./ted circumstances against which they hau ^ButVe're *>? month of May these oircum.tnn--.es had 1 1 v rh(.>?i*i. Tne Ru-*ian army had cro:H?d the Uanubc, otcup-.jtf th? Drobtudscba and vhruateued thu lne i f the Ealtwn. The success ol thi- movement, ho * e?r dcpende'lca the caytur, of Sillatrla; and the gal tUt place followed by the defease treat v ol the 13th oi .luue between Austria and the Porte turned th'; fortune of th? war. Tuc allied forie* hi*<. meanwhile mufewl to Vamawhere tliey w?re reaOv to at-^ir t in t".!e defence of the Balkan had the Rutuians taken Silist.'i? ?nd continued their advance. But tbe Fmpeiorof the French had expressed ia the' pt r? ngesi terms hi. ^solution to avoid a m*reh upon the Danube, and to abstain fron an expedit on into the DannOian province?, which couVJ only have produced the most fatal results. If our mwuory serves us, ?tUer less than ten mouths have elap<e<I since the British min isters, aeo those who shared tteir opinions, were croon ed to a ?iorm of obloquy because they steadily reei ted tbe appeals made to them to t?>row our forces into this mrilcut) ana desperate situation It was ftlt, ha never, that tho alllod a;o*crum?mts, ht.ving entered upon this war, could not allow 'hcir a - maments to remain ina stive, or n?gl-ct any m?aui likely | to bring the contest to a glorious termination. j pedition to the Crimea had been regarded from the arst L on a of tbe objects to he kept in G> n, rain, sail wlieu the whole Russian llnehatretr )?,tel acioss the Danube, and even btjond tbe Vruth^ tbe | Taurio heainsula wan obviously the fittest field for th? o rei at ions of the maritime Towers. The French government, however, appaars to hare, ev pressed at an e^xi.v period its pref-reuee ' ??r KaiU .as the tace of opt-raiiciLs on tho Crimean coast, anl something like a r-j.ro-cb i> cast upon tin ailed *'<s?eraU lor bav ing selected their place o! land-nj; auil attack It is on tills joint thit we . hirer Irom tLo at which the author of ths artic.e In tho ha. ai rived. The project of a landing had ftequently attracted our attention, and ?as m? ie tl> aii once adverted to ia tnese coUman , but alter full conskiera'-icn, in whicn w? nad the alvanUge ol' tie opiaion* of eotue of the highest indltary ^uthoii- j tie? in Kurope, wl.o were not con. ulted by ilie irenoa i Government ie were led to the conviction thit al though Kail'a oflered the grest advantage* ol auy ( point in the Crimea for the and ng and tlrsi cjlablwh rnent ot tne am.y and for the fleet, yet th?t Ut position of this pott presented al.no?t htailes to our advance agaUht : febantopol _ lhe gr^ ? ci licit ncy ol toe army was, tna. it landed to ^ middle of ?eoteail?r without adequate meacB of tr?nH poit anil with a teebie divsion of calvary, white it r> lnain' d ileueni-'eat for many necessaries on tho lleet. A msreb I torn Kali a Uf.r.n Simpheropol would haue coin nelled the army to enter upon a hue of country sepa rated from the sea by a chain of high mountains, and ei posed to flank attacM from the light troops of the etemv. To uadertiike eueh a march of l'?0 m ies in tbe condition the aimy was in hist autumn would Lave been an enterprise of the m^s: perilous kiul Hadtheer.iedU.cn landed at Kail'*, as some of tae officers in high donimand were .isposed to recommend, it would probably have been compelled to pisi the * n ter there in inVctt.m, and tbe a.lied government , woald have been TOtinilly accused of treachery 'o tbe cau fl Ihev profesied to d.ftnd ; lu fact, they might, with far c-eater advbntagchave passed tbe winter in tae B}?pb? u" Luv it arpears to to be at the pre-ent time un^ ceccroup and incorrect to lay the bUme of our 'iflicullies upon n?-n who took a dicition which wan ratified at the time by public opinion ar.d iununent tbrouglioat Ku:opo. MoreoTer, one of th. ve'v fiTot dliot'ior.s givm V> Marshal ft. Arnaud. in th<> even of ble inv&iiing the Crimea, was to feize the lmr j U t(< BslskUva, and to maintain the communications lifctsfen ih? aimy ni-.d the fhlp i . It is not, thetefi'ie, ^o the r rateg tal plan of thu campa gn, as sdoi.ttd by the a M A i\nrfc u (Wei he critic*.**}* can w fuU^y alrtre."htd. The errors conimiE'.ed have occurred much more la tie esecution of '.lie pl?n thau in the conseption o it. NVe l egret that at ceitain times and o^portuoitiei a viecrousat tempt was not made to defeat the releving ]?m, cS the enemy . whe.eas this French ntate^nt admits tbat we had ro army of oby.ervat on at M 1 We shPTfl the univt^ai at-Uniebment at the m*one. in which tie eieg^ has bee n conducted? the a'.t mot , ti . . v, r upwards of 20 wiles of works and approaches ilie delay which occurred in the fi<st when an allark was possible ? the n-glect of all m-iaoi to anticipate and destroy ^be wor.s of tbe e^mr ris lmr as if by magic, before our eyee? ar.d the '"tooisU SJ'bUncnes. wtileh nulTtred the Russians to occupy ^Mortify the M?lon whi.n -r.u.nB ftiMoi'ti it is pitnited ltO >araa nearer xo the FYfPcb linfs tban to tb?lr oro. Thwart jome of the raufcca ^bicb ba^re fruit rated the ^ , all aTM/ inomi.on xy^r "ack ^No^oubt.^the'' d^c^U^ s ' of ' the besie'geV were |?eat and extraordinary, but so were tW of ^ bo i,rn the hicliest achievement of ihe art o war is te S advantnjt of those difficulties for oneself and to 4 4V- m ?#, rue disadvantage ot tbe enemy. Ayrdeiog, l^re ore n the maia wUh this French .Utem-nt as to the strateciral operations of the campaign, we cannot ae.ent to7ts c.fence ef the technical operations of tne ' ^Tseems on the contrary, to have turned out tl at BlE?.rs?lt is now intimated that the armles hsve the lescuree of taking the tl-ld. We sincerely hop* that this decision, wh eh we have now strenuously atfo caled for more tban a montn, has at eat I een tiken , ? a wHVnnt more enorKV command and vi?for in -Si?. it is imjoisiblo to carry on successful warfare. 1 he Manifesto and tlin Vienna Confercncc. [I'aiis (April 11 ? 0 P. M ) Ccrrei pun lence of the Times ] Tbe giest tvent of to uay in Paris In the article in the M< nittur, the sense of which 1 was enabled to give in a few woics yesterday. It will be followed by aautner, equally if r-ot still more interesting, on tUu political, as this is en Ihe military quettion. The art cle is generally attributed, and I have tome rsason to suspect with tiuth, to M. A. de Laguerroniare, but it beats evident marks of having been touched by the hand of the Ktn prror, paiticularly in the scientific or technical ptris. That the toae of this artie'e is warlike cannst be coubt (d, but the imptesilon proiuced in high pclit cal quar ters ie, that the plan of military operations hitherto fol lowed is about to be modified, otherwise the vastness of tie undertaking, as against riebsstopol, an.V the superi ority of theRuisiane in position and m^ieriai, would l oroly be dwelt on so much. As I observed yesterday, tt'eeeeireto disengage, or rather cover, tho respumi hility ef the Fmperor is manifest throughout: ani the faults in ttraiegy that have been committed are to be irn ruled to others than himself. we may, I suppose, assume it as correct that the In htiuctlms, o? which extracts are given, were really ct mmunicated to Marshal St. Arnaud; they will tell on tbe aimy, and tfcere is li'tle doubt the/ are intende 1 to do io, but it would have completed the Idea given of the forethought and judgment of the Emperor if the M<r *L?1 weie alive to confirm them. I have said tmt the article ts considered as inten led to prepare the nruif nail the natltn for tbe transfer of tlra operations to some otter place, and opinion Is metoly divided at t? tbe lo cality. Poire believe tbe theatre will be in another part of the Crimea; others that tbe troopH will embark ani pro ceed towtrca Odessa, scd that the war will be cirrted on io tbe southern provinces of hussia, under tua direction of thelmperor him-eif. 1 am not awsre that any news of a kind ts hi relied onbaaccme Irom V enna to daj. 1 may mention, how ever, tbat few indeed expect any good fr >re tie confer ence. or that Russia will yield ?n the question of tlie li mitation of her force ia tb? Black Sea, or that she will recognize the right of the Potsers wt>o have no termtory cn those ihoies to call upon her, who has, to redoce her lot res. It is thought certain that France and England will persist ia demanding such Mm-tations and that on thla lu concession will be made. When neither parity yields, of court? the Conference must bretk up, and there are people hf>e who confidently affirm that M. brouyn <te l'lluys will be in Pans on Saturday or Sunday, but not with | once. 1 ktow nniy of one peraon of emlaene* who inel nee Io an opposite opinion, hut 1 do not kn&er the reasoa (f his holding it . The Tut TVtOH COUR8B, L. I. Iba race announced to tab* placo j*Rter?Uy afternoon, bitwMn Angellae, Union, and May Fly, wu postponed on account of the weather. At the boat appointed to Rtart, a grwvt numb*? of persona imi on the ground, and were <iaJte disappointed wkti it wan ascertained that th* horsea would n?t atari. A faw of th* gentle men pi??ent offered to make np a purs* for th* hone* to tick f'.r, rather than return without witnesticg a race. The owner of May Fly waa willing to start, hut tb*otbeiR refused. A match was made at Woodruff* yesterday afternoon, between g. g Mark Maguire, an j bay mare Aageitn*, for 1500 aside, to go as they pieate, three week* hence Obit cum jr. Hon. Famuel 3piig?, foraer.y Oo*em"r of Mary'j?nd. d-(i n pris<* Ofirge'a c?unty on the iilit . aj*4 a-vn. j ttne y?a?. Board of Aldtntfrn. The Fowl met last evening Uaic 0. Darker, E*q., Pf tidect, In the chair. THE BKPOBT OS Tills NATIVITY OF Tint TOllCt. On the reading of the minutta of the U?t meeting' Alderman liatRicK moved to amend the minute* by la certing before the report of "The -p?cial Committee ap pointed to investigate the accuracy of the report made by the Chief of Police,'' Ac , the worda,:"John H. Brigga, one of tte Special Committee." The correction was ac cepted, the report being a minority report, and signed by c ne member of the committee on y We deem it unnecessary to publish the report, aa It ia a n.ere rccapitu'ation of the evidence taken before die c '.aiumlce and already Inlly published. MIMKLI.AJff.otS PATKBH. t evetal petitions for fbe correction and remiaaioa Of tax "?? receite' and referred. Communications were tecei *?d (rem the Chief Eng netr of the Fire Dtp art mett, with ci.mpl-.inU kgnios' several o( the members. Belerri'a to tlie Committee of the Kire Department Tae report o f the ( ijnroKtee of the t ire Department to refer naolatio U' relative to the election of Assistant Kngmeerv to the I!omr-l ot Foreran, otltbaT ieparlmant, ?t. adopted. Several papers from tke Board ot CouacUmen were re ceived acd referred viiTo vtm TOK KAY0H. The follow \v? comm jnieation from hhs hot or the Mayor, enclosing iin opin.in fiom tie Corporation Coun sei respecting t'ao want of power of tae Board i? appoint C.ty Surveyors wit-Bout the ?dgoature of the Mayor, ?ra? rtail and ordeieu on file: ? Mati H'h Os-ricr Near York. April 2S, IBM. TotniOoN.Tio liiiAtn 01 A - GttTUHi ii ? I r'tpnttfnlly bug lus?e tr roturn herewith the resolution oripinititTg in yo\jt botrd, ?pprintiofr John B Wadsworth out o'.' the City t? rvayors of this city with | out Hi 7 r if nature an to refer to he aocomf keying opinion oi the Counsel to the Corporation as tumii-hog the grounds ' upon which my nijcc.vjn it based. 1 have ?xainiood the opinion 0-f the conrsef. and agr 'e with hlai that thv Com ?ion Coaaeil have no poorer to appoint City Surveyors, jx aept u po i? nf mu ation of ;he Commit -teller of.Strowta. Very rrtpectfufly, FERNA.'DO \VO<>l>, Mayor. Law Dkp/ wtsuckt, L'i-v or New Turk. ( O11101 *r Coi'ndl ru Ooaro?Arioit. April 21, lr&> ) l)iAa Sir? 1 have ret *ve4 yonr note roqiie-ain< mj opinion whether the Common Council, v 'Shout thowomina tion of the Street ConmiseJin-r. have tiuncht to appoint City Stfrveyers, and havo .ho honor t^ reply : 'l' te lyth section ot the amended ehai rto* of 1M9 autHorisee tivc Com mon Council to establish oth r lrtreaux be ide? tho<o men tioned in that act; and in pu.simaoool tl> autliority the Cimuion Council, by the ?ei.v -nl ordinance' ot ?1)th May, 1N1!> e?ti bliehed the linieni <>'? City Surveyors in the Ue part men t of Street Ct uinfiasicier The hi ^da of Dopart inetitx, hy tectivn i;0 of the act rt'lJMy. are autiiioriietf to no minate and, t y and with the cutaent of th? Retrd of Alder men, to ai-point the 1 eails of Li -Mix. Aithoivli t>y the er dir. a nee i"-ne of the City Survey or? are deuon ia>tod aa the htada of the burexux, yet each .t them puaaote equal an tbority with rhe otheri, and int. ; therefi.ro, la my Judu mi nt, he tairly considered aa c?i 'ii1; within that d'^aerip tlon, accordiii" to ' ho a* irit and int eut of the amended char ter. l>> the HA section th' Comu -m Council are prohibited Irotii tmm.iottn: ? ?n\ executive hi.aine/t whatever, except approvinir or reacting noiniuation ? made to them; and I am therefore of .?nnit.n tbat they a n lot authorized to ap point City Snrrai <>r? without the uomina'ion of the Street Couimintioner. The bureau of t'ity Surve?or? not having been created by th> act, it may be suppose,! that the Com mon Coun' it ]'0.neK8 nueh autlii rity. under tbat portion of the Jlith tection, which provides that " All otfieera whoae a| poiniinont aie not otheraiae provided for ahalt be eleu??<t er appointed in aoeh manner as the Common Cou<>cil ahall, by ii.w, tretcribe," but the provitdon i? no longer in force, hiving teen rerja'ed bj the act of 1881, page l,nt)2 Rea pectfnlly ai bmitted. R. J? DILLON. lion FannANun Wood. Mayor of New York CI1AHGK OF LEVYIXO 1II.ACK M Alt. O.V PHI1UC WORKS. Ali'ermau ilrmticK oiler* d the following resolution:? Retnlved. That tho tfTuers of the Croton Aqueduct De [arni cnt are re inettid to inititute an inquiry and aieer tain il any ol the f"/.uicii or mpcriuten ienit, ?|)W the work of layfim water fll w npon the fc /litli avenu", ??rho aro paid for their aer<ieea treni the city treasury, have oxantel. ioJi cited or received any portion of the raihin^a oftlie lahorera under their charce at n pift or ^tatmty, > r far the purchaae of wateliea or other tentiuinnialt; a id th*t the olHo?rt ot the Crotoa Lepartnient sre hereby reqneate^ to dlamia* from their employment any tuch foreinar nn ahall he proved to have lavied, forced loaus, aubacriptiona or cOLtrihatinna (?r to havo improperly teceptid any it t'tt of muuey or valuable tokens) from the hania of the poor laboring wen upon that public work. Alderman Hkrrick aiid that the py.-tem ohouU bs put a atop to, and be emild state, without mentioning the came, that the AlOerman of the Twentieth w?rd knew of a similar ca^e to that alluled to in ttie resolution. In answer to a call for name, Al:erm*a liernck an Fittiffl J K. Fall Alderman C. II. Trri;8R mid that ho knew of a case where a n>ac. bad been presented by the workmen with a watch valued at Sl-~<, but it wag given him by theu o*n vo'itioa. Aldtrmrc Pkakk sakt he knew what A Merman Tacker cHuded to, hut tie (Al!. 0.) also knew tbat Alderman C. II. Tucler, with soni?fiiend?, went into tee tiouse of a man m Sunday and urana a pin aliog. and than came down to the Mayor1# ollice auil inroriied him of the fact. Alderman C. 11 Ti:ckeh could not permit each an aa aert oti to paes withi ut ]ironounclog .t falae. Aldrman Ukakk? 1 can prove it, and the man that b&^s wbut 1 etota >8 Mm, I pronounce to be a liar. Aldetmaa Wakkhan n.me ta thu rescue by spaaklng ia favor o' Ms llah, and said ib?t f a present wax made to Lim .t must i.ave ha>e been given voluntary by the men usder b s charge Ah!rrmart Hvkhii k .iavl that he knew tuat men whoae fatoliiea wera quartered in the Almshouse dur.ng the winter, were oili|ie' to par these supciotendenta on the pubhe works SI each on t&e'.r second receipt of vagt-. that the mocev was exacted ogtensib'y to bu ? a watch for the superintendent, nn.l the moment the poor itru pay their dollar, they are turned out and new men taken io. and thus tte tux is levied on each new man uniil the work in completed. Alderman W. Titkkr hoped the r*so'.ution would paaa; he be'leved tbat this system was earned on in all the da partui'ntf, and be tboupbt It would be well to paaa thia iecolutiop. ac?l follow it up by a.'milar motions respoot ini the other departments Alderman Howaki/ would not oppose the resolution, though he could not see what good it could do He thought they might turn nearer home aau rnahe snch inquiries. Alcertnan VooBBr? Did you ever get any? AMetman How Ann? Not the first red cant. Ther? never was any one thought him worth it, though he had knewn a member ol the Common Couucil who received a pref entation worth $800 or (1,(10. The resolution was ac'opted. Tim INSKCfRIPY OF ELIiRinOK STRKKT I'RISO.V. A communication wat received from Snerill Or set, stat tig that he hac on several occasiins called the atten tion of the Board to the necessity oi mating addi ticnal security and alterationa in Kl(!ridge street jail, lhe recent escape of two prisoners from that butiding forced him again to urge the abeo ut* necyaatty of mak ing the prison more aecure. Referred to Commit .ee oa Repa-rs ani Supplies V-VLKNTINK 8 MANrAL. A icftlution of ttio Hoar 1 of Councilman, awarding the sum of Ji.oiu to David T. ValenVne, Clerk of the Com a, 1 1 Council, hr a compensation (or tbe masterly man - ter in which he la 3 e.ilted the New York Manual for toe current ytar ? lefleitug tbe highest credit on tbo author, both as a oompiler and historian was nanimoua ly (.occurred in "SAM," UiDKiKA.VT, WANTS MORS MS/HI, A'dtrman Briuuh otTeied the follow. ng: ? Wlitrtaa, The Special Committee baa been Rtoeely insulted and tl.oir power defied by Wm. McKellar, Hr. MaUell's chief clerk; tbeialore. Itciolved, Tbat tbo Spucial Committees eonaisting ef AlJcrn.en tiringe, C. II Tucker and lloffm r?, (srhioh ?K. appointed tu ascertain. the tiuthfulnosi ot Qe r*a W. Mat f ll> report, rtep?ctlnr t lit- im| rieanm^nt of policemen.) ba, and thejr aro hereby empowered to inver^katu all frauda and corruption in evary branch of the I'ol ice Department , and al?o the n.ar.ner in which It is and ban bean condu itoi, in addition to tbt lower tbey p.aaesa by a previous resolu tion AMtrrcan IIekrick a?'*eJ waa it intended to paaa tbni ' AMerroan Bp.iooa? I more itt aOoplion AM'imi n Kki.lv moved tint it lay on the table. A'.itimm Howajui seconded the ir.Ation to lay on the table. 'I he motion to lay on the table *?i put anl lost, by ? of IS to V. Alt'exinsn Hsrbicic thought tutt after tbe preamble they should inwrt tbat "tlr McKeiiar ought to be re primanded sort be ashsmed of L:m:e.f " (i&ughter.) AW' man Kki.t.y hoped that neith-r tti? resolution nor amendment would be adopted. He had hoped that Ua committee had kvlp far enough. H? submitted that Mr. McK-Uar Dad not ofiered any intuit to tiie commit tee: he had aitweiad every question tbat t'je com mitt** were empowered by the rmola'iou of tnis Board to aalt. He had otly refused to rf-poi.il 10 irrelevant questione. AloermkD Hkrrich saio be never saw committee no eager foi power, but he thought they bad got power enough alieany. Aloeiman H km v moved that the resolution be referred to the Law Committee. AU'erman Vookju* moved tbat it be referred to the Ainu-home Committee, (laughter) Alderman i.ly accepted the amendment, which being put, waa lofcthy a vo'e cl 12 to t> Alderman Hbhsick's amendment waa pat, w4 leet by a similar vote. 1) e previous queattan being put, wm carried b? a t? te ot 11 to 7. AMiiam Wakkkan moved a reconaideration of >*ie qu*tl<-n. at he old nut deem it proper to be on the ?? cords for aa a lawyer, would nowise Mr MoK?; ar that ho was justified in relating to an* war thare l>/e^ levan'. questions which bad been pnt to ttin. Motion to recot aider was loat. ordixam k tsarac-tutu tk* halk or oysthrh Alderman tux ollered a resolution to theefleot tbjsl th? prohibition of aeiiing oysters dating tbe rummer moaUie take place from tbe Atat ot July matead of tbe 8rst ot May, a* ordered by tie elty ordinance. Adopted. After some other business the Board adjourned t# tbo first Monday la May. Impel lor Coul-lperlsl Ten?, Before Hon. Judge UofTmur ... April 20 ?A l/en n. Cornelius randtthm ?n4 John ftrter. Sheriff ?The plaintift in thin ea?u obUlned a%io junction aga<nst Mr VanderbiH. restraining blp fro-n retaining poeaeetion of books, he., belonging te the Ni caiagua Transit Company, of which the plaintiff was the ?eciral agent Tbe |>i?-?nt motion waa tune to dissolve tN li' junction. The Judge granted an ordet dissolving tbi injunction, on the gr. und tbat Mr VnnderhUt h#A, bad noaaeeaion of the b?ek? (with the plaintiff's vo?w. leHte) for two years past, and the paper* do nat sUo* % sufficient renaon for ratatotcg tbe injunctisn | t'nlted Haln District Coart. Before Hon Jmtge Hall. ytrRii ? Tbe Gran'' J ir> , of c*th>r C C* >r, F?q waa foreran, wer~ arttoWu 1?.y. for tUc t.- ?n?? sci on ot bsiina a.